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Abstract 
Morocco’s border with the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla has brought the country 
into direct relations with the European Union (EU) on the issues of border control and migration. 
In response to the growing human rights violations towards migrants and refugees enumerated in 
the Conseil Nationale des Droits de l’Homme’s (CNDH) 2013 report, King Muhammad VI passed 
a migratory policy that emphasized preservation of human rights within Morocco’s borders. This 
study examines the effects of Morocco’s relationship with the EU on the implementation of the 
human-rights aspects of Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy. Using the semi-structured interview 
approach, I will speak with migration scholars and activists to determine the nature of Morocco’s 
relationship with the EU to gain an understanding of the reality migrants and refugees face, 
especially in Northern Morocco. Through comparison of these narratives with the official 
partnerships and policies implemented between Morocco and the EU, this study seeks to determine 
whether the ongoing human rights violations near the Moroccan-Spanish borders are the result of 
pressure from the EU, a failure of the 2013 migratory policy, or a mixture of both phenomena. The 
lack of awareness about the new policy among individuals at the border in combination with 
increasing pressure from the EU due to the ongoing Mediterranean crisis are both massive 
obstacles to the implementation of the 2013 law. Though these factors contribute to the ongoing 
human rights violations, this study examines the possibility of human rights existing at any border.   
Research Question: Does Morocco’s relationship with the European Union prevent the full 
realization of Morocco’s human-rights based migratory policy? 
Key Words: International Law & Relations; Law; Peace & Social Justice 
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Introduction 
Morocco’s “international commitments” to the EU date back to March 1, 2000 when the 
Association Agreement which “constitutes the legal framework for relations between the EU and 
Morocco” came into effect.1 In 2005, Morocco signed the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
which progressed the Association Agreement and committed both signatories to “principles of the 
market economy, free trade, sustainable development, reduction of poverty, and the institution of 
social, political, and legal reforms.”2 The EU had also passed the European Security Strategy in 
2003 which prioritized a “ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders 
of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” to combat 
“terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime.” This report stated that security is necessary for development, without which 
conflict is born and “turbulence and migratory movements” from the regions affected are 
inevitable.3  
Morocco’s tensions with Spain over the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, located in 
Morocco’s north, began when Spanish forces took up arms at the enclaves’ frontiers in 1957.4 
Though this particular incident was a direct result of tensions related to Morocco’s independence, 
securitization at the borders between Morocco and the enclaves continued to increase in later 
decades. Since independence, thousands of migrants passed through Morocco in an attempt to 
cross the fence into Ceuta or Melilla because those who reach the Spanish territories are brought 
                                                          
1 “European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Morocco, Strategy Paper 2007-2013,” European Union 
External Action, 2013. 
2 “European Neighborhood Policy,” European External Action Service, 2004. 
3 “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” European External Action Service, December 12, 2003. 4. 
4 Special to The New,York Times. (1957, Dec 13). Moroccans Note Tension in North, New York Times (1923-
Current File). 
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to the Spanish mainland for interviews with immigration officials.5 Two individuals died when 
hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants attempted to cross the double razor-fence at Melilla in August 
2005. One month later, 12 were injured when 70 migrants attempted to cross into Melilla.6 On 
September 29, 2005, hundreds of migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries tried to cross the 
razor-fence that separated Ceuta and Morocco; a phenomenon that injured close to 100 individuals 
and killed four. At the time, the Moroccan and Spanish governments were engaged in a summit on 
immigration in Seville. Each government denied the use of unnecessary force against the migrants 
though news sources reported that two migrants suffered gunshot wounds that corresponded with 
bullets from Moroccan security forces.7 Following the events at the border, the Spanish 
government sent 500 troops to Ceuta and Melilla as a precaution against further crossings.8 
Beginning in 2005 and continuing into 2006, Spain committed to increasing the heights of the 
inner fences to 18 feet; double that of the outer fences.9 
In 1985, five European countries signed an agreement on the gradual removal of border 
checks between member states in the European Community. Ten years later this agreement was 
realized as the Schengen Area which removed internal border controls, promoted judicial and 
police cooperation, and set common policies on external borders, illegal immigration, visa 
arrangement for third-party nationals, asylum, and illegal immigration.10 The conditions for 
joining the Schengen Area included taking “responsibility for controlling the external borders on 
behalf of the other Schengen states,” “efficiently cooperat[ing] with law enforcement agencies in 
                                                          
5 Smith, C. (2005, Nov 05). Spain's african enclaves are migrants' portals to europe. New York Times (1923-Current 
File)  
6 (2005, Sep 22). Spain reinforces enclave borders. BBC, accessed December 1, 2015.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Smith, C. (2005, Nov 05). Spain's african enclaves are migrants' portals to europe. New York Times (1923-Current 
File)  
10 Schengen area. In The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. : Oxford University Press.  
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other Schengen states in order to maintain a high level of security once border controls between 
Schengen countries are abolished.”11 As the New York Times wrote, “once the migrants arrive [in 
Ceuta] they can take advantage of the fact that borders have been virtually erased in the European 
Union.”12  
On June 7, 2013, Morocco and the EU signed a Joint Declaration Establishing a Mobility 
Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States. 
This partnership dealt specifically with migration and aimed to strengthen the relationship between 
the two parties to more effectively manage the northward flow of individuals from Morocco. While 
the report included initiatives to streamline consular and legal services, raise awareness about 
human trafficking, institute integration support networks, and assist in voluntary return, the joint 
partnership did not include measures to stem violence at the borders. Those attempting to cross the 
border to Spain through Ceuta and Melilla were not protected from police brutality under this 
partnership. There were no provisions for real cooperation between the two parties; rather, each 
party committed to working on reforms within its own borders.13  
In July 2013, the Moroccan organization Conseil Nationale des Droits de l’Homme 
(CNDH) published a report on the violation of human rights in Morocco. This report, published in 
partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Delegation 
interministerielle aux droits de l’Homme (DIDH), called for authorities, social actors, and state 
partners of Morocco to create a new migration policy that protects human rights.14 CNDH 
                                                          
11 "Schengen Area." European Commission. November 13, 2015. 
12 McLean, R. (2005, Sep 30). 5 killed in mass attempt to cross from morocco to spanish enclave. New York Times 
(1923-Current File)  
13 Joint Declaration Establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union 
and Its Member States. Rep. no. 6139/13. European Commission, 7 June 2013.  
14 Thematic Report on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees I Morocco: Foreigners and Human Rights in Morocco: 
For a Radically New Asylum and Migration Policy. Rep. Conseil National Des Droits De L'Homme, July 2013.  
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criticized the “ad-hoc” nature of previous Moroccan migratory policies and labeled the 2007 policy 
that granted the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) license to review and 
grant asylum applications a “policy of control of illegal emigration . . . evidenced by the numbers 
of arrests and the statements of satisfaction from European countries.” In addition to categorizing 
individuals of concern—refugees and asylum seekers, foreigners in irregular administrative status, 
trafficked persons, and documented migrants—the report proposed initiatives like integration 
networks, access to justice for trafficked persons, granting of residency documents, sensitivity and 
cultural training for personnel working with migrants, trade union campaigns “to encourage 
membership of migrant workers” and a ban on violence against undocumented migrants.15 
On September 10, 2013, in concurrence with the CNDH report, King Muhammad VI held 
a working session in Casablanca “to discuss the issue of immigration . . . with a view to devising 
a new comprehensive migration policy.”16 He acknowledged that Morocco was no longer a transit 
country and that the need had arisen to “regularize the situation of people in terms of residence 
and the activities they perform, as well as legal immigrants of other nationalities, including sub-
Saharan immigrants.” While denying that there is a “systematic use” of police violence against 
illegal immigrants, the King noted that the rights of migrants must be respected. He called for a 
“Royal Initiative” to protect human rights in accordance with the Constitution, the rule of law, and 
“Morocco’s international commitments.” The reforms would include granting residency, certain 
social services, and the right to work to refugees (as determined by the UNHCR).17 On December 
9, 2013, notably after the announcement of the new migratory policy, Morocco acceded to 
                                                          
15 Thematic Report, CNDH.  
16 “HM the King chairs in Casablanca working session on immigration in Morocco, King’s Office,” Agence 
Marocaine de Presse, September 10, 2013.  
17 Ibid. 
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“advanced status” in the ENP.18 Following Morocco’s accession, the EU and Morocco agreed to 
work together to combat illegal human trafficking, respect human rights of migrants, and to offer 
applicable individuals asylum under principles laid out in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 
1967 protocol.19 The ENP manifests itself most visibly in Northern Morocco, where processes to 
institute a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTAs)—like the EU’s agreement with 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—are underway.20 Hundreds of millions of euros are poured into 
“development projects” in the Rif region, which sees the highest number of inhabitants migrate 
from Morocco. Presently, of members in the ENP, Morocco receives the greatest funding, which 
may range from €728 million to €890 million in the 2014-2017 period.21 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report in February 2014 that showed that Moroccan 
security forces continue to use violence against migrants expelled from Melilla.22 The international 
human rights organization noted that Spain was doing nothing to stop the abuses. HRW called on 
Spain to stop “summary returns to Morocco” until Morocco demonstrated that migrants are no 
longer at risk of beatings and other abuses within its borders. When HRW interviewed those living 
in camps in Nador and Oujda, it discovered that few individuals living there would qualify for the 
“exceptional” regularization procedure in 2014 that would allow certain undocumented migrants 
to apply for a one-year renewable residency.23 HRW reported that security forces in Nador rounded 
up migrants and sent them on buses to locations thousands of kilometers away from the border. 
The migrants who were not forcibly removed were threatened with the use of force as a means of 
                                                          
18 “European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Morocco, Strategy Paper 2007-2013,” European Union 
External Action, 2013. 
19 Ibid.  
20 2013 Annual Operational Report: Neighborhood Investment Facility,” European Commission, 2013, 5.  
21 “ENP and Enlargement Negotiations,” European Commission, 2014.  
22 “Morocco: Abuse of Sub-Saharan Migrants,” Human Rights Watch, February 10, 2014.  
23 Ibid.  
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coercing them to walk to Algeria—a violation of non-refoulement. In August 201424 and February 
2015,25 government forces burned down migrant camps at the base of Mount Gurugu and expelled 
people to the south. A representative of Asticude, an activist organization in Nador, who had 
originally expressed hope upon hearing the new migratory policy, declared that the country cannot 
“have this contradiction between the laws and the practice.”26 
The following study addresses the nature of Morocco’s relationship with the EU and 
explores the effects of this relationship on the full realization of Morocco’s human-rights based 
migratory policy. Using the semi-structured interview approach, I will speak with migration 
scholars and activists to analyze the nature of Morocco’s relationship with the EU and to gain an 
understanding of the reality migrants and refugees face at Morocco’s northern borders. Through 
comparison of these narratives with the official partnerships and policies implemented between 
Morocco and the EU, this study will determine whether the ongoing human rights violations near 
the Moroccan-Spanish borders are the result of pressure from the EU, a failure of the 2013 
migratory policy, or a mixture of both phenomena.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 “Moroccan authorities raid camp of migrants waiting to cross into Spain,” The Guardian, August 21, 2014.  
25 “Morocco destroys migrant camps near border with Spanish Enclave,” The Guardian, February 11, 2015. 
26 Schemm, Paul “Migrants scattered by Morocco’s new immigration policy,” Paul Schemm, Yahoo, February 18, 
2015.   
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Literature Review 
In this literature review, I intend to present the two dominant arguments about Moroccan-
EU relations, the limitations of the 2013 migratory policy, and the published reports about the 
human rights violations at the Moroccan-Spanish border. The first school of thought on Moroccan-
EU relations argues that Morocco is passively subject to the EU’s externalization of borders. The 
second school of thought argues that Morocco holds negotiating power in deals made with the EU 
and only carries out the sections of EU policy that are in its best interests. As the 2013 migratory 
policy is so recent, the literature published so far on the policy cannot make concrete conclusions. 
The last section of the literature review focuses on the Doctors without Borders (DWB) and Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) reports that present the abuses migrants face at the Moroccan-Spanish 
border. The scholarship and reports that follow will lay a foundation for the analysis of the 
Moroccan-EU international migratory policy’s effect on the 2013 migratory policy.  
I. Morocco: Subject to European Union’s Externalization of Borders 
Michael Collyer argues that the EU attempt to increase border security changed borders 
from static lines to “processes, continually in flux” which “spatialized” state authority to create 
transnational spaces.27 He states that since the 1990s, migration policies have sought to 
institutionalize the “growing inequalities of access to mobility.”28 As the EU sought to stop 
irregular migration to its member states, a system of “remote” controls began to proliferate. These 
measures included visa controls, airport liaison officers, and carrier sanctions. He observes that 
                                                          
27 Collyer, M., & King, R. (2015). Producing transnational space: International migration and the extra-territorial 
reach of state power. Progress in Human Geography, 39(2), 187.   
28  Collyer, Michael. In Between Places: Trans-Saharan Migrants in Morocco and the Fragmented Journey to Europe. 
University of Sussex Press, 2007.  
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Morocco’s 02-03 law, which criminalized undocumented residence within Morocco’s borders, 
actually contained many of the provisions that the Moroccan government had rejected in the EU’s 
1999 Moroccan Action Plan. The 02-03 law gave the Moroccan police force and army greater 
power to stop clandestine migration. Unsurprisingly, following law 02-03, relations between Spain 
and Morocco immediately improved and migration controls between Morocco and Spain 
increased. Collyer argues that major migration control operations undertaken by Moroccan 
security forces often correspond to official meetings between Moroccan and European officials.29 
Collyer’s argument that the externalization of EU border controls has led to a crackdown on 
migrants in Morocco can be used to support the hypothesis that Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy 
cannot be fully implemented if the EU continues to have a strong presence in Morocco.  
Although written in 2006, Hein de Haas’ argument in “Trans-Saharan Migration to North 
Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends” that the EU’s security-based approach to 
migration is detrimental to the protection of human rights holds true today.30 He argues that 
pressure to curb irregular immigration from southern EU-member states on Morocco and other 
North African states had several unintended and counterproductive effects: the increase in human 
rights violations in North Africa due to heavy internal policing led many migrants who had 
intended to stay in North Africa to leave for Europe; the increased externalization of EU borders 
prompted a diversification of sea routes; and the proliferation of professional smuggling routes.31 
Haas argues that the EU’s policymakers do not understand that North African states hesitate to 
sign externalization policies because they do not want to be viewed as destination countries; the 
“transit” states only comply with the EU’s “fight against illegal immigration” as a way to bargain 
                                                          
29 Collyer, In Between Places.  
30 Haas, Hein De. Trans-saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU Historical Roots and Current Trends. 
Washington, D.C: Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source, 2006. 10. 
31 Ibid. 11-15.  
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for benefits like development project funds.32 While he goes on to state that North African states 
are unwilling to act as “Europe’s policemen,” Haas seems to support the argument that Morocco, 
and its bordering countries, do not have the ability to act as equal negotiators in EU migratory 
policy discussions.  
Stefan Lehne, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, criticized the ENP in his paper “Time 
to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy.” Written in 2014, the paper outlines the major 
problems with the ENP and calls for the policy’s immediate revision. Lehne explains that though 
the ENP was constructed in parallel with the “EU’s enlargement experience,” membership in the 
ENP does not guarantee accession to the EU.33 Though the policy was intended to bring structural 
democratic reforms to Europe’s neighbors, the ENP’s “instruments are ill-suited for the rapid 
change that characterizes much of the EU’s neighborhood today.” Perhaps most importantly, he 
criticizes the EU’s hypocrisy in its bilateral relationships, writing that while the EU “insists on 
conditionality in its relationships,” it “applies those conditions inconsistently and infrequently.”34 
Though the ENP’s array of problems encompass a wide range of issues, Lehne suggests that the 
most effective change ENP policymakers can make is to increase the flexibility of ENP-
instruments. The diversity of Europe’s neighbors and the need for regional solutions over bilateral 
ones necessitates an innovative policy toolbox. Though Lehne’s analysis focuses on the economic 
and political aspects of the ENP’s failures, his critique of the ENP’s inconsistencies and inability 
to adapt bolster our understanding of the EU’s role in Morocco over the past few years.  
 
                                                          
32 Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration, 13.  
33 Lehne, Stefan. "Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy." Carnegie Europe. February 4, 2014. 
34 Ibid.  
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II. Morocco: Challenger to EU Policy 
 In Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe: Past Developments, 
Current Status, and Future Potentials, Michael Bommes discusses the inevitability that all 
member states of the European Union will be in need of labor in the future and explores the 
argument that the Middle East and North Africa are the “ideal demographic match” for Europe.35 
The primary section in this text relevant to the understanding of the relationship between EU 
border security and Morocco’s domestic migration policy is the discussion of “boundary build-
up.” “Boundary build-up” describes the tendency EU member states had to call for greater border 
security following the 2011 Arab Spring. The ambiguity of the distinction between external and 
internal security and the contradictions EU security policy poses to the neo-liberal market is also 
discussed.36 While the text is primarily economic in nature, Bommes’ conclusion that the EU  is 
reliant upon migration from the south supports the argument that it would benefit the EU to re-
envision its external border controls to complement Morocco’s domestic migration policy.  
In “Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from 
Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco,” Daniel Wunderlich analyzes the effects of the 
EU’s external migration policy in Morocco.37 While this essay was written in 2010, Wunderlich’s 
commentary on the EU’s wish to “shape the complex set of borders of inclusion and exclusion to 
the state territory of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC), to their communities 
of belonging and labour markets” is applicable to analyzing the EU-Moroccan relationship to this 
                                                          
35 Bommes, Michael. Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe: Past Developments, Current 
Status and Future Potentials. Amsterdam University Press, 2014.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Wunderlich, Daniel, “Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing 
EU Migration Policy in Morocco, Mediterranean Politics, 2010, 15:2, 249-272.  
 
D U T T A  | 15 
 
day.38 There is a paradox between the SEMC’s unwillingness to converge with the EU on 
migration control and the bloc’s unease “about turning into countries of immigration.” Domestic 
policies and EU policies converge due to bilateral relations of individual member and non-member 
states, intra-EU coordination problems, and “EU dependence on actors in SEMC to implement its 
policy objectives.” He describes the evolution of the current Moroccan-Spanish relationship which 
began in 2003 when King Mohamed VI refused to cooperate with Spain until the EU Commission 
made “considerable concessions to its Moroccan counterparts.”39  This paper also analyzes border 
control and funding and explains that the Moroccan migration policy agenda is governed by 
international repression and the EU’s national development program. Interestingly enough, the 
head of the Directorate for Migration and Border Surveillance noted that Morocco has accepted 
its role as “Gendarme of Europe” largely because the country seeks to stem increased sub-Saharan 
migration. According to him, European externalization of border management was “not an 
illogical approach” as “we must be given the financial and logistic resources to fulfil our 
ambitions.”40 This perspective on the Moroccan-EU relationship as one where Morocco benefits 
from its role as “Policeman of Europe” provides a counterargument for the popular theory that the 
relationship between the two parties has a large power and agenda imbalance.  
Another essay that challenges the dominance of the theory that the North holds the most 
power in the North-South relationship is Nora el-Qadim’s “Postcolonial challenges to migration 
control: French-Moroccan cooperation practices on forced returns.”41 This essay focuses on two 
major instruments of international cooperation on migration controls: “the posting of immigration 
                                                          
38 Wunderlich, Differentiation and Policy Convergence.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 El-Qadim, Nora “Postcolonial challenges to migration control: French-Moroccan cooperation practices on forced 
returns,” Security Dialogue, 2014, Vol. 45(3), 242-261. 
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liaison officers and the statistical evaluation of cooperation.”42 El-Qadim writes from the 
perspective of state actors in the “countries of origin,” a category to which Morocco belongs. She 
notes that destination countries view “deportation as a way to fix the failings of their border control 
and to reinstate the control of the state over the territory.” She echoes Collyer and Haas when she 
argues that Morocco’s delegation as a transit country by the EU is more the result of tightened visa 
requirements than undocumented migration. She also writes about Morocco’s resistance to sign a 
readmission agreement with the EU despite the military, economic, and historical imbalance 
between the two parties. She focuses on the “instalment” of a French liaison officer in Morocco 
who coordinates both countries’ police departments in the migration field and on the use of 
statistics to “evaluate the cooperation of Moroccan authorities in deportation policies.” Her work 
shows that Moroccan mid-level actors, typically portrayed to be pawns in a “dominated state,” can 
“develop effective counter-discourses to resist the demands of a ‘dominant’ state.”43 El-Qadim’s 
essay elaborates on the work of Moroccan bureaucrats in the field of migration and provides the 
insight that EU policy might not be as easy to implement in Morocco as dominant theories make 
it out to be.  
III. The 2013 Moroccan Migratory Policy 
Abdeslam Amakhtari, the president of Asticude, examines the limitations and current 
realities of Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy while addressing its sustainability, shortcomings, 
and the internal conflicts and external pressures that affect its implementation in his thesis “La 
gestion de l’immigration subsaharienne au Maroc: limites des lois et perspectives de la nouvelle 
                                                          
42 El-Qadim, Post-colonial Challenges, 245-252.  
43 Ibid. 242-261.  
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politique migratoire.”44 While he spends much of his thesis detailing Morocco’s decades-long 
entanglement with migration flows in Africa, the crux of his thesis lies in his discussion of 
Morocco’s various migration policies and the way these policies incorporated the protection of 
human rights. He states that a successful migration management policy has to do more than satisfy 
the state; it must respect and protect the fundamental rights of migrants.45 In one section of the 
thesis, Amakhtari writes about the externalization of EU borders and writes the primary European 
method of enforcing border control in its neighboring states is through the signing of readmission 
agreements. A readmission agreement with the EU would oblige Morocco to readmit those who 
were arrested on EU territory after crossing from Morocco, though many of those arrested had 
merely traveled through Morocco and were not Moroccan nationals.46 Amakhtari’s thesis supports 
the arguments found in el-Qadim’s essay that Morocco does not passively execute EU policies and 
rules. The country actively participates in negotiations with the EU and rejects the conventions—
the readmission agreements specifically—leading to the implementation of migratory policies 
which threaten Morocco’s autonomy.  He examines the interplay between international agreements 
and Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy, which he states had a limited impact on migrants in Nador 
due to the lack of awareness about the policy in the region and the fear many migrants felt that the 
new policy was a way for the security forces to send them back to their countries of origin. 
 
 
                                                          
44 Amakhtari, Abdeslam. La Gestion De L’immigration Subsaharienne Au Maroc: Limites Des Lois Et Perspectives 
De La Nouvelle Politique Migratoire. Rabat: International University of Rabat, 2015.  
45 Ibid, 58.   
46 Ibid, 30.  
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IV. Human Rights Abuses at the Border 
 Prior to the CNDH report, Doctors without Borders (DWB)/Medecins sans Frontieres 
(MSF) published a report in March 2013 that denounced the continuous violence and abuse 
migrants face near Nador and Oujda.47 The report stated that the broadening of the EU’s border 
externalization policy in the past decade had “trapped” 
 many sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. When this report was published, Morocco’s 02-03 law 
relating to the “Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Morocco, Emigration, and Irregular Emigration” 
was still in force. This law criminalized stay in Morocco without official documentation and led 
to “social violence, discrimination, stigmatization, and marginalization” directed towards the 
migrant population.48 Without documentation, migrants were unable to work, find 
accommodation, and receive a public education. They lacked basic resources and lived in camps 
in the forests near the borders. At the time data was collected, half of the interviewees had lived in 
Morocco for more than six months, a quarter for six months to one year, a fifth between one and 
five years, and seven percent for more than five years. The report concluded that the longer 
migrants stayed in Morocco, the more vulnerable they became not only to violence but to physical 
and psychological disorders. This report, in concurrence with the CNDH report introduced in the 
“Background” section, contributed to the formation of Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy.  
In February 2014, Human Rights Watch issued a report titled “Abused and Expelled” 
which reported severe human rights violations of migrants living near Oujda, on the Algerian 
border, and Nador, on the Spanish border.49 While the report’s data was collected before the 
                                                          
47 "Violence, Vulnerability, and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe." Doctors Without Borders. March 1, 
2013. 
48 Ibid. 21.  
49 "Abused and Expelled." Human Rights Watch. February 10, 2014. 
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implementation of the 2013 migratory policy, most of the human rights abuses at these cities were 
ongoing even a year after this report’s publication. HRW reported that Moroccan police had raided 
the camps migrants set up near the borders and confiscated possessions, beat migrants (including 
the children), and violated non-refoulement by expelling many to Algeria. The organization 
interviewed 67 sub-Saharan migrants and concluded that Moroccan Auxiliary Forces and the 
Spanish Guardia Civil used excessive force against those trying to enter Melilla. The report called 
on Moroccan government to ameliorate the situation for migrants as entailed in the 2013 policy 
and urged the Spanish government to stop the arbitrary expulsion of migrants from Melilla. HRW 
“asks the European Commission to investigate and monitor Morocco’s treatment of migrants” and 
to ensure that “Morocco is in accordance with the European Union and international human rights 
standards.”50 Ironically, HRW asked the European Commission to monitor Morocco to ensure that 
the country does not abuse human rights standards, yet Spain, a member of the European Union, 
also took part in the human rights violations at the border. Though published almost two years ago, 
the human rights violations enumerated in this report continue in Nador and Oujda; an indication 
that the “human-rights” emphasis of the 2013 migratory policy has failed.  
While published reports indicate that Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy has not ameliorated 
human rights at the border, HRW’s August 2014 report, “Spain: Halt Summary Pushbacks to 
Morocco,” shows that even if Morocco stemmed human rights violations on its side of the border, 
Spain would still perpetuate violence against migrants.51 During the week of August 11, 2014, 
close to 1,300 migrants attempted to cross the six-meter fence separating Morocco and Melilla. 
Video footage taken of the events shows Spanish Guardia Civil officers beating migrants who had 
                                                          
50 “Abused and Expelled." Human Rights Watch.  
51 "Spain: Halt Summary Pushbacks to Morocco." Human Rights Watch. August 18, 2014. Accessed November 16, 
2015. 
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already crossed into Spanish territory. Spain’s own immigration policy states that any individual 
who enters Spain without permission must be escorted to a National Police Station for 
identification and to begin deportation procedures. Every individual is entitled to a translator and 
to a lawyer. The video, however, shows Spanish officers sending many migrants directly back to 
Morocco without any legal recourse.52 The perpetration of violence by Spanish border officers 
displays the difficulty at ameliorating the human rights situation at the Moroccan border and the 
challenges in reconciling Morocco’s domestic commitment to human rights for foreigners with 
growing EU pressure at the borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 “Spain: Halt Summary Pushbacks,” Human Rights Watch.  
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Methods and Methodology 
As I seek to understand the relationship between the EU and Morocco, and how this 
relationship, and the agreements that resulted from it, affect the implementation of Moroccan 
domestic policy, I will be doing primarily qualitative and content based research. My qualitative 
research will be made up of a series of semi-structured interviews with migration academics and 
activists who work firsthand with those affected by the international migratory policy between 
Morocco and the EU. I chose this method of data collection because while there were clear 
questions I needed answers to, I also wanted to allow the interviews to have some flexibility. My 
content based research will be conducted through reading and analyzing reports issued by the 
European Commission and by the Moroccan government. I will also track the development of 
partnerships and initiatives between the EU and Morocco.  
I conducted my research primarily in Rabat for three weeks in November 2015. I chose to 
stay in Rabat because most major international organizations and scholars are based out of the 
capital. I had originally wanted to interview individuals at the Ministry of Moroccans Living 
Abroad and the Ministry of Migration as well as individuals at the European Union Delegation. I 
had intended these interviews to capture the official rhetoric of the Moroccan government and the 
EU towards their relationship with each other as well as towards the ongoing human rights 
violations at the Moroccan-Spanish border. It quickly became clear that getting into contact and 
conducting an interview with these individuals was not going to be possible. While I emailed all 
my contacts at these two ministries and tried calling them in following weeks, I received no 
response. I also tried (to no avail) emailing the European Union Delegation as well as emailing 
individuals who had worked on various EU-funded projects in Morocco through contacts that 
Philippe Staatsen of the EU gave me. All government organizations are largely bureaucratic but I 
suspect it was the subject matter—human rights violations at the border—that also played a role 
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in the lack of response. While I was disappointed, the lack of interviews with government officials 
was not detrimental to the project’s purpose. Any information I would have received from either 
party would have been filtered through its respective institution and would not differ greatly from 
the communiques, partnerships, and policies each party published.  
I chose all of my participants because of their professional experience and knowledge of 
EU-Moroccan relations. During my literature review, I came across two major schools of thought 
in regards to the relationship between Morocco and the EU. The first theory states that Morocco 
acts as the “gendarme” of the EU and holds little power in the relationship between the two parties. 
The second theory states that Morocco is an active participant in relations between the two parties 
and holds an advantage in negotiations. Much of the scholarly literature and policies I have read 
about Moroccan-EU relations seem to support the first theory. I wanted to diversify my research 
and gain an understanding of the second school of thought which has gained popularity in past 
years. The SIT Migration program had assigned a few articles written by Professor Mehdi Alioua 
a scholar who writes extensively about migration in Morocco and about Morocco’s autonomy in 
dealing with the EU; a stance that places his work firmly in the second school of thought. My 
academic director, Dr. Souad Eddouada, and adviser, Dr. Zakaria Rhani, recommended that I get 
into contact with him and he graciously invited me to his office at L’Universite Internationale de 
Rabat for an interview. Dr. Anitta Kynsilehto, a scholar of human rights and issues of mobility in 
the Mediterranean, had spoken to our class during our trip to Nador in September about the issues 
that Ceuta and Melilla present to Moroccan migratory policy. I received her contact information 
from Dr. Eddouada and conducted a structured interview through email. While this was not the 
ideal way to conduct an interview, geography and busy schedules combined with a time difference 
made this method the only way of having an interview.  
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For my interviews with activists, I contacted the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and Asticude, an organization in Nador that works extensively with migrants 
and refugees. The UNHCR was extremely welcoming to my program when we visited in 
September and I received with the same openness and helpfulness from the organization when I 
went for an interview in November. I had read about Asticude during my literature review, as the 
organization was cited in many articles about the human rights violations at the base of Mount 
Gurugu. While I originally thought visiting the organization was out of the realm of possibility, 
Dr. Eddouada met Asticude’s president, Abdeslam Amakhtari while in Nador and put us into 
contact. Due to the welcoming nature of Asticude, I was able to visit Nador and spend a few days 
with the organization. As Asticude worked directly with migrants who live in camps near the 
border with Melilla and has seen the effect of the harsh security policy implemented by both 
Moroccan and Spanish security forces, I was extremely happy to have the opportunity to talk to 
activists Mr. Amakhtari and Mr. Hicham Arroud while there.  
As my research question is policy-based, I reviewed all of the Moroccan-EU partnerships 
as well as Morocco’s 2013 migratory policy before the interviews. This project is not attempting 
to gather perceptions of the relationship between the two parties but seeks to understand the 
realities behind the relationship. I had to prepare informed questions from which the scholars and 
activists could build their answers. It was only after becoming fully comfortable with the workings 
of the ENP and the Joint Partnership for Mobility in the Mediterranean that I could write informed 
questions in order to get the most out of my interviews. I went into my interviews with a set of 
themes, ranging from “what do you think about Morocco’s new migratory policy?” to “what are 
the changes you have seen in border security since 2013?” 
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 I left time and space for the conversation to develop organically because I knew that new 
questions would arise as I heard the respondents’ answers. I followed Joseph C. Hermanowicz’s 
strategies of “converse, listen, find all that your date [interviewee] finds important, and probe.” I 
felt that I came away with more information from the interviews that began with a simple 
conversation from which the questions sprung organically than from the interviews that were more 
structured. A slight difficulty I came across in the semi-structured interviews was language 
comprehension. I have working proficiency in French and am able to fully understand and take 
part in normal conversations. Conducting an interview in another language is a wholly different 
matter, however, as it was necessary for me to learn many French policy terms related to migration 
before I entered the interview. It was more difficult for me to ask follow-up questions during the 
interviews conducted in French. Though each participant allowed me to record the interview on 
my phone, leaving me free to engage fully in the interview, it took more effort to comprehend the 
interviews in French. I do not think I captured all of the nuances and details that those who spoke 
in French included in their responses while I felt that I could glean more information from the 
interviews in English because I was able to comprehend the responses fully and ask more 
questions. Each participant signed a consent form in whichever language he or she felt most 
comfortable in after I explained that I was a student writing a final research project.  
To avoid a single story, I tried to look at the issue from all angles. It is easy to restrict policy 
to the pages of a report of the boardroom of a ministry of international organization though policy 
is intended to affect people on the ground. I also kept in mind that the answers each participant 
gave do not frame the question in its entirety. After I had transcribed the interviews, I analyzed the 
responses in the broader field of Moroccan-EU partnerships and the 2013 migratory policy in order 
to compare the reality to the policy. Though I cannot draw a broad conclusion about the 
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relationship between Morocco and the EU through a few interviews with academics and activists 
and through policy analysis, I can begin to outline the fundamental problems this relationship poses 
for the full implementation of the 2013 migratory policy.   
 I think my position as a 21-year old American student studying in Rabat for the semester 
helped more than it hindered me. All of my participants were academics or activists and thus were 
doing me an immense favor by meeting with me and agreeing to be interviewed. I think my being 
a student with an interest in migration helped me because all of the people I interviewed are 
extremely passionate about their work and were excited to share the work they do. I am very 
grateful for the opportunity to talk with these scholars and activists and I hope that in attempting 
to answer my research question in this paper, all of their work can be seen.  
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Findings  
I. Legal Agreements between Morocco and the EU 
 The main legal agreements governing relations between the EU and Morocco are the ENP 
and the 2013 Joint Mobility Partnership. According to the European Commission’s 2003 
communique, the growth of the EU to 25 countries necessitated “drawing closer to the 385 million 
inhabitants of the countries who will find themselves on the external land and sea border, namely 
Russia, the Western NIS, and the Southern Mediterranean.”53 The communique lay out conditions 
for entering the ENP, including the demonstration of “shared values and effective implementation 
of political, economic and institutional reforms,” and promised that all countries that followed 
these guidelines would “be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further 
integration . . . to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital.” The ENP 
states that these “shared values” include a respect for human rights as codified by the EU Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Morocco is mentioned in two major 
sections—trade and migration—of the original ENP. Migration—specifically curbing illegal 
immigration—is a key objective of the ENP and “concluding readmission agreements with all the 
neighbors, starting with Morocco” is stated as a prerequisite to this goal.54  
While the ENP’s stated goal is an enlargement of the surrounding area that exhibits European 
values, the pattern that the policy’s reforms have taken in the past few years indicate that the ENP’s 
foundation is primarily security-based. The ENP’s first major reform was in May 2011, shortly 
after the onset of rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt and civil war in Libya and Syria. Titled “A New 
                                                          
53 "Wider Europe--Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors." 
European Commission. 2003. Accessed December 4, 2015.  
54 Ibid.  
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Response to a Changing Neighborhood,” the paper acknowledged that the general nature of the 
ENP did not allow for differentiated relationships with each neighbor state to develop and that 
“greater support” must be given to the south and east to foster “inclusive economic development,” 
“deep democracy,” and “consistent regional initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, transport or 
migration and mobility.”55 This version of the ENP introduced the foundation for the 2013 Joint 
Mobility Partnership56 in its section on migration and pledged to “develop a mutually beneficial 
approach where . . . well-managed legal migration, capacity-building on border management, 
asylum and effective law-enforcement co-operation go hand in hand.” This section called the 
“promotion and respect of migrants’ rights an integral part of the approach.”  
The second major reform of the ENP came in November 2015, five days after the Paris attacks. 
Terrorism and the refugee crisis were named as the two main reasons for the need for an upheaval 
of the ENP. It claimed that “Europe’s own interdependence with its neighbors” had become a 
security risk for the continent, and while the policy clearly tried avoids reactionary rhetoric, it was 
unquestionably clear that the main focus of the new ENP is Europe’s security. The ENP stated that 
“intensified cooperation with our neighbors is needed in these areas [security-sector reform, 
conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalization policies].” Though Morocco, one of 
the EU’s highest acceded members, benefits from EU funding, cooperation with the EU will 
eventually reach a point where Morocco has little to gain. Morocco is not guaranteed accession to 
the EU though the ENP’s logic may seems to imply that by following certain conditions, a neighbor 
state will be brought closer and closer into the European sphere.57 
                                                          
55 "A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood." European Commission. May 25, 2011. 
56 Detailed in the “Background” section. 
57 Lehne,"Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy.” 
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Dr. Mehdi Alioua at the International University of Rabat spoke candidly about Morocco’s 
relationship with the EU and expressed that Morocco held more power in the relationship than is 
generally thought. When asked about the general characteristic of relations between the two 
parties, he first clarified that though the EU exists in theory, in reality it is not able to negotiate 
because of its fragmented nature. The EU is not the “United States of Europe”—each member is 
part of an economic zone but there is no political exterior.58 Though the EU imposed this 
relationship on Morocco, he argued, Morocco is well aware that the EU does not politically 
function as a unit. He referenced France’s unwillingness this summer to admit migrants and adhere 
to EU-quotas to display how individual member states can have wildly different agendas than the 
larger union of which they are part.  
Dr. Alioua also explained that the Schengen Area necessitated stronger security at the EU’s 
frontiers and created fluid borders that promoted injustices in neighboring countries. Member 
states demanded greater external security after its introduction. The term “Schengen Area” is 
misleading, however, because there is no “Schengen visa”; rather, there is a French visa or a 
German visa that allows nationals of these countries to travel throughout the Schengen Area 
without border checks. According to Dr. Alioua, the absence of a “Schengen visa” means that there 
is truly no European policy on immigration—the policy on EU immigration is just “pour le 
décor.”59 “Fortress Europe”—the heavy hand Europe exercises in deciding who to let into its 
borders—creates injustices and is contradictory to the rights of man. The stronger security at the 
borders engenders numerous human rights violations and frustrations in simply determining where 
                                                          
58 Alioua, Mehdi. Interview by Anashua Dutta. Semi-Structured. International University of Rabat, November 17, 
2015.  
59 Ibid.  
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the border with Europe is located. He asks “where is the border? In Spain? In Melilla? In 
Morocco?”60 
While Morocco’s relationship with the EU generally revolves around finances, neither scholars 
nor activists seemed convinced that Morocco engaged in relations with the EU solely for money. 
Dr. Alioua called the relationship “strategic” as money from the EU helped Morocco solidify its 
position as one of the most advanced countries in its region.61 Dr. Anitta Kynsilehto stated that 
though there are “direct economic gains” for Morocco, perhaps the “wider gains in terms of 
Morocco’s reputation as a reliable partner” that translate into indirect economic gains are more 
important.62 Commenting on the EU’s side of the relationship, Hicham Arroud, a civil society 
activist at Asticude, said he believed that pressure from the EU on Morocco mostly fell in the 
political, and not the economic sphere. Arroud argued that though the EU could alter its funding 
to Morocco in order to promote a certain outcome, the more common way that the EU goes about 
its pressure tactics is through revisions in the rhetoric of the ENP.63 
II. EU-financed Projects 
The projects related to migration that the EU funds in Morocco are divided into six major 
domains: the promotion of the integration of migrants in Morocco; asylum; fight against 
trafficking; promotion of migration as a means towards development; awareness about the risks of 
migration; and return and reintegration into country of origin.64 Each domain includes several 
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projects that are implemented in Morocco through the EU’s partnerships with various Moroccan 
government ministries and NGOs. The mission of each project only gives a partial sense of the 
EU’s motivations in funding migration-related projects in the Morocco. In order to fully 
understand the EU’s intentions, the relative importance it places on each project—in this case 
measured by the amount of funding each project receives—must be taken into account. 
 The two domains that receive the greatest funding, by far, are “promotion of the integration 
of migrants in Morocco” and “promotion of migration as a means towards development.”65 
Projects in the former domain for the 2015-2019 period include medical coverage for regularized 
migrants (€2 million); insertion of migrant children into Moroccan schools (€2 million); medical 
and psychological care for 1,500 vulnerable female migrants including pregnant women, women 
with babies, and victims of violence (€1.4 million); pathways to integration for 1,500 migrants 
including professional training towards employment or self-employment (€3 million); and 
technical assistance to le Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résidant à’Etranger et des Affaires de 
la Migration (€1.6 million).66 Whereas millions of euros are allocated to these projects that seek to 
socially, medically, and professionally integrate migrants into Moroccan society, only €40,000 
was spent on a 2014-2015 project called “improvement of the state of health, living conditions, 
and dignity of the most vulnerable sub-Saharan immigrants in Nador province.”67 It does not come 
as a surprise that the EU views funding migration-related projects in Nador, which poses a direct 
threat to Melilla, as a low priority compared to projects that would incentivize migrants to stay in 
Morocco. The “migrant rights in action,” a 2014 multi-country project scheduled to end in 2017, 
has a budget of €10.5 million though currently, the EU has budgeted that Moroccan actors of civil 
                                                          
65 “Projets Finances Par L’Union Europeene,” UNHCR Rabat, 1, 3-6.  
66 Ibid. 1.  
67 Ibid. 2.  
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society will receive three grants of €100,000 to protect victims of trafficking and migrant domestic 
workers.68 
 The domain that focuses on promoting migration as a means of development receives even 
greater funding from the EU for eight projects which range from improving cooperation between 
Moroccan and EU officials to creating opportunities for migrants to contribute to Morocco’s 
economic development through agricultural work.69 The most funding (€5 million) under this 
domain for the 2014-2017 period is allocated to a project promoting communication and the 
exchange of expertise between Moroccan and EU officials. While the description of this project 
states that a main goal is to distribute expertise of the EU member states in response to the need of 
Moroccan institutions, an interview with Arroud brought to light the lack of expertise that EU-
member states have in the domain of migration. When asked about the pressure that the EU places 
on Morocco, he stated that a huge problem with the EU was that it has no real unique strategy 
towards migration. In his experience working with migrants and refugees in Nador, he has 
observed that while the EU will change its migratory policy from time to time depending on the 
situation, it has no sustainable or comprehensive vision.70 His comment that Spain and Morocco 
are able to negotiate bilateral conventions on migration despite EU migratory policy was the main 
critique of the EU that emerged in many interviews. The EU is made up of many states, each with 
different interests due to geography, economics, and domestic policy, and does not have control 
over the bilateral conventions each member-state makes with southern or eastern neighbors—even 
if these bilateral conventions are contrary to the multilateral conventions the EU negotiates.  
                                                          
68 Ibid. 2.  
69 The amount of funding Morocco receives from the EU for the promotion of migration as a means towards 
development is not exactly known as the numbers given by the EU are not specific to Morocco. Most projects in this 
domain are implemented in more than one country and encompass several members to the south and east of the EU 
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70 Arroud, Interview.  
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 There is no doubt that on paper, the EU-funded projects in the domain of migration 
emphasize the rights of migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. What is also clear, however, is 
that the funding allocated for projects that involve migrants integrating into EU-member states or 
for projects that focus on human rights for migrants at the border is negligent if it exists at all. 
Projects emphasize local integration, support for Moroccan institutions which work with migrants, 
and the creation of a network of information among the EU’s southern neighbors that will allow 
all concerned states to be better informed about the current state of migration in the Mediterranean 
region. Morocco’s main border with the EU is in Nador yet the province is only mentioned once 
in the list of 25 projects. The sole project concerning Nador received one of the lowest budgets of 
any project on the list. This table of EU-funded projects does not include EU-funding of Morocco’s 
border security at Ceuta and Melilla though the EU does directly contribute to this aspect of 
Morocco’s budget. Arroud noted that at the end of 2014, Morocco, financially backed by the EU, 
began construction of a higher border between Melilla and Nador.71 None of the EU projects in 
the domain of migration inherently stand in contradiction to the 2013 migratory policy. The 
projects’ dismissal of the ongoing human rights violations at the border—to which migration owes 
its existence—speaks volumes about the EU’s concern with the realities at its borders.  
III. The 2013 Migratory Policy—Hopes and Realities 
 Asticude President Abdeslam Amakhtari, said that the activist community felt hopeful after 
the passing of the 2013 migratory policy.72 The exceptional one-year regularization policy and the 
emphasis on human-rights that characterized the policy were welcome news to Amakhtari, whose 
organization sees firsthand the injustices migrants and refugees face at Morocco’s border with 
                                                          
71 Arroud, Interview   
72 Amakhtari, Interview.  
D U T T A  | 33 
 
Melilla. While the 2013 migratory policy seemed to address the many human-rights issues 
Morocco had been criticized for in the past, the implementation of this policy has not made great 
improvements in the field of human rights.  
 The 2005 events at Ceuta and Melilla are often pointed to as the beginning of the heavy 
securitization of the Moroccan borders. When asked if he had seen a change in Moroccan border 
security since 2013, Arroud stated that while Morocco’s new migratory policy had little effect on 
the border security, the 2005 migrant crossings catalyzed a movement to increase the heights of 
the three fences that separate Morocco and the Spanish enclaves.73 Amakhtari also noted that 
both the Moroccan and Spanish authorities must take responsibility for the way they acted against 
the migrants in 2005, comparing the violent crackdown to a military operation. He stated from that 
point on, Spanish authorities have responded to these crossings with force while Morocco has 
committed to building taller and taller barriers.74 Anthony Berginc at the UNHCR echoed 
Amakhtari’s sentiments when speaking about the EU’s security-based answer to migration. The 
events at Ceuta and Melilla that prompted the construction of three different fences separating 
Spain and Morocco hardened the possibility for people to cross the border, prompting a shift in 
migration routes from Morocco to Spain to Libya to Greece/Italy. The security-measures at the 
border includes Spanish and Moroccan guards at the fences and the Moroccan Royal Navy that 
intercepts migrants on pateras every day.75 
 Arroud, who has worked with many individuals who qualified for residence under the 2013 
migratory policy, expressed dismay with the policy’s implementation. He stated that though the 
policy seemed progressive at the onset, the execution of the operation began with strict conditions. 
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Most migrants enter the country after walking thousands of kilometers and usually have no 
identification documents with them. Some lose their papers because of the journey while others 
purposely leave their papers in their country of origin in an attempt to complicate repatriation if 
they are caught. Arroud stated that while most come to Morocco thinking of going to Europe, the 
heavy security at the border and the strict maritime control in the Mediterranean necessitates 
staying in Morocco. While the residence policy would technically have a tangible effect on the 
lives of the many migrants living in the forests of Mt. Gurugu, many for years and years, Arroud 
explained that neither the residence aspect nor the human rights aspect of the policy were well 
instituted in Nador. Buses still come to Nador once to twice a day to round up migrants and send 
them to cities—Fez, Meknes, Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh—far away from the border. Police 
forces find migrants in the street and arrest them. According to Arroud, “even for someone who 
wants to go grocery shopping for his family, he can anytime be arrested or kicked out to cities 600 
to 1,000 kilometers away and then must look for money to get back to his family. We would like 
to know what respect of human rights means if people can’t walk normally in the streets.”76  
Dr. Kynsilehto observes that “there seems to be a regime applied in the border areas, which 
includes the implementation of the 2014 regularization campaign. Applicants from Nador seem to 
have been more likely to receive a negative answer as the authorities seem to think the only reason 
for a migrant to stay in Nador is to try to cross to Spain.”77 When asked if she has seen a change 
in border security since the implementation of the 2013 policy, she said that the only security 
measures that have slightly altered are the deportations or dispersals of migrants which are “now 
directed towards internal areas of the country rather than to the Algerian border.”78 She states that 
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in past years, even before 2013, there have been concerted efforts made to keep migrants as far 
away from the borders as possible.  
 Amakhtari, Arroud, and Dr. Alioua denounced the February 2015 breakup of migrant 
camps at Mt. Gurugu as a clear violation of the 2013 migratory policy and of the UDHR. Article 
13 of the UDHR states that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each State.”79 Individuals have the right to leave their country and seek residence in 
another one and should never be robbed of this right just because they do not have identification. 
Amakhtari criticized the Moroccan government for its order to carry out the displacement of 
migrants in February, saying that there was no legal jurisprudence for this action and that the 
Moroccan government had violated every right the migrants possessed.80  
 Lack of awareness and fear were the two main factors activists at Asticude and the UNHCR 
named as contributing to the failings of the 2013 migratory policy. When the regularization policy 
began in January 2014, Arroud reported that only four migrants asked for regularization in the first 
three months. Asticude discovered that many migrants did not trust the operation as they did not 
see any change in the way the authorities treated them. The police continued to put them on buses 
to different cities and continued to use brutality as a tactic to maintain order. Many were afraid 
that the policy was a ploy to send them back to their countries of origin. Those who were willing 
to talk to authorities often could not because of communication issues. These people lived 
thousands of kilometers away from where the policy was issued and unsurprisingly, were not 
informed about their rights.81 Berginc shared that the UNHCR has a similar problem when trying 
to inform migrants entering through Oujda about their rights as asylum seekers or potential 
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refugees. As the border with Algeria is officially closed and before 2013, no international 
organizations were allowed in that area, the UNHCR has no presence in the north. Yet, 90% of 
people who come to the UNHCR office in Rabat enter Morocco through Oujda. The UNHCR has 
partners in Oujda that must subtly refer asylum seekers or potential refugees to the UNHCR, 
though it would be far more effective to establish a UNHCR branch in the north to inform 
individuals of their rights.82 To combat the lack of awareness in Nador, Asticude began a campaign 
of information in the forests to educate migrants about their rights to residence and their rights to 
be treated with respect. This campaign had great success—404 migrants from Nador were 
successfully regularized by December 2014.83 Though the residence aspect of the policy was 
ameliorated by the campaign of awareness, the events of February 2015 indicate that brutality 
against migrants persisted.   
IV. Human Rights and the EU 
Though there is no debate about existence of massive human rights violations at Morocco’s 
border with Melilla, there are different theories about the motivations behind the violence. Alioua 
stated that human rights violations at the border are not a uniquely Moroccan phenomenon. States 
never support the irregular migration of people at the borders. To use his example, France does not 
close its borders to please the British. In a powerful statement, Alioua concluded that “there are no 
human rights at the borders.” He conceded that though Morocco has made efforts to better the lives 
of migrants following 2013, the country is more sensitive to migration control because of its 
geographical location and because it does not possess the infrastructure that European countries 
possess to process irregular migrants. When asked if relations between Morocco and the EU changed 
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post-migratory policy, Alioua said it was too early to tell though he believes that the policy gives 
Morocco greater leverage in readmission negotiations. As he had stated previously, the Moroccan 
government knows that all negotiations with the “EU” are technically with Madrid, Paris, and Rome, 
and not with Brussels.84  
Activists in Nador took a harsher view of the EU when they were asked the same questions. 
Arroud stated that pressure from the EU, and especially Spain, on Morocco has been ongoing, 
especially given the security-threats the EU feels it is under. Post-2013, the EU has been making a 
greater push to incentivize Morocco to sign a readmission agreement, which would make Morocco 
responsible for readmitting any individual who had passed through its territory before reaching EU 
territory. The latest talks, Arroud shared, have revolved around the EU’s desire to build migrant 
camps—similar to the current camps in Slovenia, Serbia,, Greece, and Hungary—in Morocco. 
Several EU members, including representatives from the border agency FRONTEX, met with civil 
society activists last summer to negotiate a new migratory policy. Arroud said no amount of 
convincing could persuade the EU to change its original stance: migrants must live on the south side 
of the Mediterranean.85  
Amakhtari said that though the EU’s policies shallowly revolve around the rights of man, its 
primary goal will always be the externalization of its borders. He adds that the EU’s primary method 
of widening its borders is through the signing of development conventions with third-party “origin” 
countries.  He notes that no matter how much pressure the EU places on Morocco to play the role 
of “policeman,” Morocco still has autonomy in negotiations and has not displayed any hesitance in 
pushing back against the EU’s border expansion. He concluded the interview saying that the EU’s 
primary objective is to externalize its border control while closing its eyes to the violations of the 
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rights of man that occur because of its expanding power.86 Kynsilehto’s statement about the effect 
of the Moroccan-EU international agreements on the 2013 migratory policy takes on a similar tone. 
While the two policies are not contradictory in “the sense that the cooperation between Morocco 
and the EU includes different dimensions and the EU has sought to ameliorate reception capacities 
(with emphasis on legal reform but also indirectly for example by financing international 
humanitarian organisations that work in Morocco),” Europe’s externalization of borders cannot truly 
match “the spirit of the 2013 migratory policy.”87 
Though there is greater security at the borders with the Spanish enclaves, the UNHCR reported 
that the fences erected at Ceuta and Melilla did not change the number of people who came to their 
office. This may partially have to do with the fact that those who want to cross would not come to 
the UNHCR because they are not interested in seeking asylum in Morocco. Those who want to leave 
Morocco do not want to leave a sign of their presence in Morocco, though the UNHCR does not 
give anyone the information of those who come to their office. Berginc states that while the border 
has become increasingly more difficult to cross, there are still smuggling networks that individuals 
use to travel to Europe. Morocco has a unique problem because of the geopolitical challenges the 
Spanish enclaves pose to the country’s autonomy and security.88 Since they are the closest ways to 
reach Europe for many people, there will continue to be a proliferation of increasingly dangerous 
and subversive ways to cross the border.  All those interviewed said that despite the human rights 
violations and the heightened border security, migrants and refugees in Morocco continue to have 
hope about their ability to move and make better lives for themselves.  
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Analysis 
While those interviewed held different interpretations of Morocco’s relationship with the EU, 
there was a consensus that the human rights abuses at the border were direct violations of the 2013 
migratory policy. The question now is how much of the abuse of individuals at the border stems 
from a purely Moroccan directive and how much of the abuse is a result of the EU intervention in 
Morocco? There is, for obvious reasons, no EU policy in Morocco that stands in contradiction to 
the human-rights aspect of the 2013 migratory policy. Rather, the ENP and the Joint Mobility 
Partnership emphasize the rights of migrants and commit the EU to working with Morocco on 
structural reforms in the field of migration. Many of the migration-related projects that the EU funds 
in Morocco are intended to improve the social, psychological, and economic well-being of refugees, 
migrants, and asylum-seekers in Morocco. These policies are extremely vague and contain little 
information about how these “structural reforms” will be made and about how the EU will work 
with Morocco to combat irregular migration. While the EU programs do not contain any directives 
that explicitly violate human rights, the increased border securitization in the years following 2005 
and the blatant focus on programs that would keep individuals as far away as possible from the 
European border send a clear message that Europe, as Arroud said, believes migrants must stay on 
the south side of the Mediterranean.89  
Despite the EU’s relative size and power, Morocco clearly possesses power in negotiations with 
Europe, most evidently displayed by the ongoing negotiations about the readmission agreement. 
Readmission agreements—one of the main tools the EU uses to combat irregular immigration—are 
at the crux of the EU’s negotiations with its neighbors. Most recently, Turkey and the EU signed a 
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readmission agreement that committed the EU to sending €3 billion in aid to Turkey in exchange 
for Turkey implementing even stricter border and sea controls. The aid package is also intended to 
be used to improve the lives of refugees in Turkey; very similar to the migration programs the EU 
has in Morocco.90 The EU has also pledged to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens by October 
2016 and begin re-negotiating Turkey’s accession to the EU.91 There have been many criticisms of 
Turkey’s readmission deal with the EU—namely because this deal revolves around the hundreds of 
thousands of refugees in Turkey but takes only the interests of Turkey and the EU into account.92 
While the human-rights aspects of the deal have been called into question, Turkey’s status as an 
equal player in EU-negotiations has not been. Morocco is currently in the same negotiations with 
the EU and is pushing for the same visa clause that the Turkey-EU deal contained. Nora el-Qadim 
said that Morocco had entered the topic of visa facilitation into talks long before the EU and that the 
country is firm in its stance that visa-facilitation should be negotiated in parallel to, and not as a 
condition for, the readmission agreement.93 Morocco’s insistence on making a deal on its terms—
one that will never include the building of migrant camps within its borders—dismantles the idea 
that the EU has insuperable bargaining power in agreements made with Morocco and brings the 
human rights violations at the Moroccan borders into a new light.  
Heavy securitization plays a direct role in the violent breakup of migrants’ camps near Melilla 
but lack of awareness about the 2013 migratory policy and its provisions for migrants also prevented 
the policy’s full realization. The policy, passed as an emergency measure in Rabat, would mean the 
most for those individuals living in the forests in Nador, but the government’s failure to support 
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campaigns of awareness in the north left many of those eligible for the policy unaware of their rights. 
This lack of awareness, ameliorated by the work of Asticude and partner organizations of the 
UNHCR, also allowed security forces at the border to continue using violence as a tactic to maintain 
order. Migrants did not see a physical change in the way they were treated—a major failure of the 
2013 policy.  
It could be argued that the violence at the borders is worsened by the EU’s presence there. 
Morocco is truly in a unique geopolitical situation at the exit site from Africa and the entrance point 
to Europe. Morocco has a vested interest in following the EU’s border-directives as its reputation in 
the EU would then increase and the country would be given the means to fulfill its own interests. 
This potential motivation is epitomized by a quotation from Morocco’s Directorate for Migration 
and Border Surveillance found in Wunderlich’s text. He stated that Morocco had accepted its role 
as “Gendarme of Europe” because in fulfilling this role, Morocco was given the “financial and 
logistic resources” to address its own goals.94 Separate from the EU’s wishes, however, Morocco 
seeks to exert its power by controlling its borders. It is not just agreements with the EU that have 
led to the increase in human rights violations in the north. Borders are the way states determine 
where they exert their authority. As Max Weber famously wrote in his essay “Politics as a 
Vocation,” the definition of a state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a territory.”95 There are very few countries, if any, 
where human rights violations do not exist at the border. To write this is not to excuse the events 
that occur every day near the Moroccan-Spanish border but to acknowledge that Morocco is not 
alone in its struggle to compromise human rights with state authority.  
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Conclusion 
The EU’s presence at the Moroccan border and the agreements made between the two parties 
hold Morocco accountable for regulating its borders, more so than if the EU did not have a heavy 
presence there. It is likely that the directives issued by the Moroccan government to break up migrant 
camps and to regularly expel migrants from Nador to far away cities were made in consideration of 
agreements with the EU. It would be fallacious and a discredit to the power of the Moroccan 
government to conclude that the EU is behind all of Morocco’s decisions regarding the migrants 
and refugees that live within its borders. It is in Morocco’s best interests to cooperate with EU policy 
in order to further its own agenda just as it is in its best political interests to monitor its borders in 
order to maintain regional hegemony.  
The lack of awareness about the 2013 policy among migrants at the border combined with 
increasing pressure from the EU due to the ongoing Mediterranean crisis pose massive obstacles to 
the implementation of the 2013 law. Neither factor, however, is the primary reason that the policy 
will never be fully implemented. The 2013 migratory policy cannot be fully realized because respect 
for human rights very rarely extends to state borders. Despite the rhetoric of the policy, respecting 
human rights and monitoring migration are two entities that are often at odds. Even if the EU did 
not have a heavy presence in Morocco, these human rights violations at the border would continue. 
The only difference would be that these violations might not be as widely publicized. Every day we 
see examples of how human beings are treated when they try to exercise their right to mobility. We 
see police in riot-gear throwing stones or using tear gas to stop the movement of refugees; we see 
migrants thrown to the ground; we see crowds of people screaming at those who have just entered 
their borders to go back where they came from. Morocco’s relationship with the EU might hinder 
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the implementation of the 2013 migratory policy, but the very existence of borders dictates that the 
human-rights aspect of the policy can never fully be realized.  
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